This pattern becomes obviously cumbersome when increasing the number n of individuals, as the number of required inequalities combinatorially explodes. Moreover, the formula above cannot be constructed if n is an arbitrary parameter whose value is not known beforehand. On the other hand, this same meaning can be simply captured by a natural ASP aggregate of the form count{X : p(X)} ≥ n.
Unfortunately, there is no clear agreement on the expected behavior of aggregates in ASP, and several alternative seman-tics have been defined [14] [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] , among which perhaps Ferraris' [17] and Faber et al.'s [18] are the two more consolidated ones due to their respective implementations in the ASP solvers clingo [5] and DLV [6] . Although these two approaches may differ when the aggregates are in the scope of default negation, they coincide for the rest of cases (like all the exam-ples in this paper), even when aggregates are involved in recursive definitions. Ferraris' (F-)aggregates additionally show a remarkable feature: they can be expressed as propositional formulas in the logic of HT, something that greatly simplifies their formal treatment. To illustrate this, let us explore the simple rule: p(a) ← count{X : p(X)} ≥ n, (1) where p(a) recursively depends on the number of atoms of the form p(X). Suppose first that n = 1. Since the domain only contains a, count{X : p(X)}≥ 1is true iff p(a) holds. This is captured in Ferraris' translation of (1) for n = 1 that amounts to p(a) ← p(a), a tautology whose only stable model is ∅. Suppose now that n = 0. Then, the aggregate is considered as tautological and the HT-translation of (1) corresponds to p(a) ← whose unique stable model is {p(a)}. Finally, as one more elaboration, assume n = 1 and suppose we add the fact p(b). Then, (1) becomes the formula p(a) ← p(a) ∨ p(b) that, together with fact p(b), is HT-equivalent to:
This results in the unique stable model {p(a), p(b)}.
Recently, Gelfond and Zhang [19] (GZ) proposed a more restrictive interpretation of recursive aggregates that imposes the so-called Vicious Circle Principle, namely, "no object or property can be introduced by the definition referring to the totality of objects satisfying this property." According to this principle, if we have a program whose only definition for p(a) is (1), we may leave p(a) false, but we cannot be forced to derive its truth, since it depends on a set of atoms {X : p( X)} that includes p(a) itself. In this way, if n = 1, the GZ-stable model for (1) is also ∅, as there is no need to assume p(a). However, if we have n = 0, we cannot leave p(a) false any more (the rule would have a true body and a false head) and, at the same time, p(a) cannot become true because it depends on a vicious circle. Something similar happens for n = 1 when adding fact p (b) . As shown in [20] , GZ-programs are stronger than F-programs in the sense that, when they represent the same problem, any GZ-stable model is also an F-stable model, but the opposite may not hold (as we saw in the examples above). Without entering a discussion of which semantics is more intuitive or suitable for practical purposes, one objective disadvantage of GZ-aggregates is that they lacked a logical representation so far; they were exclusively defined in terms of a reduct, something that made their formal analysis more limited and the comparison to F-aggregates more cumbersome.
In this paper, we show that, in fact, it is also possible to understand a GZ-aggregate as a propositional formula, classically equivalent to the F-aggregate translation, but with a different meaning in HT. For instance, the GZ-translation for (1) with n = 1 coincides with the F-encoding p(a) ← p(a), but if we change to n = 0 we get the formula p(a) ← p(a) ∨ ¬p(a) whose antecedent is valid in classical logic, but not in HT. In fact, the whole formula is HT-equivalent to the program: p(a) ← p(a). p(a) ← ¬p(a).
This makes it now obvious that there is no stable model. Similarly, when we add fact p(b) and n = 1, the GZ-translation eventually leads to the propositional program:
Again, it is classically equivalent to the F-translation (2), but quite different in logic programming, where the left rules enforce the non-existence of stable models. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review some basic definitions that will be needed through the paper. In Section 3, we present a generalization of Ferraris' reduct that covers GZ-aggregates and show that the latter can be replaced, under strong equivalence, by a propositional formula. In Section 4, we show that, in general, GZ-aggregates are stronger than F-aggregates in HT and, as a result, characterize the effect of replacing some occurrence of a GZ-aggregate by a corresponding F-aggregate. We also identify a family of aggregates in which both semantics coincide.
In Section 5, we lift the fragment in which both semantics coincide to their first-order languages: Alog and gringo [21] .
Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
Background
We begin by introducing some basic definitions used in the rest of the paper. Let L be some syntactic language and assume we have a definition of stable model for any theory ⊆ L in that syntax. Moreover, let SM( ) denote the stable models of . Two theories , are strongly equivalent, written ≡ s , iff SM( ∪ ) = SM( ∪ ) for any theory . We will provide a stronger definition of ≡ s for expressions in L. Let (ϕ) denote some theory with a distinguished occurrence of a subformula ϕ and let (ψ) be the result of replacing that occurrence ϕ by ψ in (ϕ). Two expressions ϕ, ψ ∈ L are said to be strongly equivalent, also written ϕ ≡ s ψ , when (ϕ) ≡ s (ψ) for an arbitrary 5 (ϕ) ⊆ L. We also recall next some basic definitions and results related to the logic of Here-and-There (HT). Let At be a set of ground atoms called the propositional signature. A propositional formula ϕ is defined using the grammar:
We use Greek letters ϕ and ψ and their variants to stand for propositional formulas. We define the derived operators
A classical interpretation T is a set of atoms T ⊆ At. We write |= cl to stand both for classical satisfaction and entailment, and ≡ cl represents classical equivalence. An HT-interpretation is a pair H, T of sets of atoms H ⊆ T ⊆ At. (Ferraris' reduct) . The reduct of a formula ϕ with respect to an interpretation T , written ϕ T , is defined as:
Definition 1 (HT-satisfaction
Proposition 2 (Lemma 1 in [22] ). For any pair of interpretations H ⊆ T and any ϕ:
As is well-known, strong equivalence for propositional formulas corresponds to HT-equivalence [23] , that is, ϕ ≡ s ψ iff ϕ ≡ ψ in that language. The following result follows from Corollary 3 in [24] .
In other words, if ϕ is stronger than ψ in HT (and so, in classical logic too), but they further happen to be classically equivalent, then ϕ is weaker with respect to stable models. As an example, note that (p ∨ q) |= (¬p → q). As they are classically equivalent, SM(p ∨ q) ⊇ SM(¬p → q) which is not such a strong result. However, since HT-entailment is monotonic with respect to conjunction, it follows that (p ∨ q) ∧ γ |= (¬p → q) ∧ γ also holds for any γ , and thus, if we replace a disjunctive rule (p ∨ q) by (¬p → q) in any program we may lose some stable models, but the remaining are still applicable to (p ∨ q). We can generalize this behavior not only on conjunctions, but also to cover the replacement of any subformula ϕ. We say that an occurrence ϕ of a formula is positive in a theory (ϕ) if the number of implications in (ϕ) containing occurrence ϕ in the antecedent is even. It is called negative otherwise. Proposition 4. Let ϕ and ψ be two formulas satisfying ϕ |= ψ and ϕ ≡ cl ψ . Then: i) SM( (ϕ)) ⊇ SM( (ψ)) for any theory (ϕ) where occurrence ϕ is positive; ii) SM( (ϕ)) ⊆SM( (ψ)) for any theory (ϕ) where occurrence ϕ is negative. 2
Back to the example, note that (p ∨ q) occurs positively in (p ∨ q) ∧ γ and so, (¬p → q) ∧ γ has a subset of stable models. On the other hand, it occurs negatively in (p ∨ q) → γ , and so, (¬p → q) → γ has a superset of stable models.
Aggregates as formulas
To deal with aggregates, we consider a simplified first-order 6 signature = C, A, P formed by three pairwise disjoint sets respectively called constants, aggregate symbols and predicate symbols. An arithmetic term is a combination of numerical constants, variables and arithmetic operators built in the usual way. A term is either a constant c ∈ C, a variable X or an arithmetic term. We use the vector overline to represent tuples of terms, such as t, and write | t| to stand for the tuple's arity. As usual, a predicate atom is an expression of the form p( t) where t is a tuple of terms; an arithmetic atom is an expression of the form t ≺ t with t and t arithmetic terms and ≺∈ {=, =, ≤, ≥, <, >} an arithmetic relation. A regular atom is either a predicate atom or an arithmetic atom. An (aggregate) formula ϕ is recursively defined by the following grammar:
where a is regular atom, f ∈ A is an aggregate symbol, X is a non-empty tuple of variables, c is a non-empty tuple of constants, ≺∈ {=, =, ≤, ≥, <, >} is an arithmetic relation, and t is an arithmetic term. A (aggregate) theory is a set of aggregate formulas. As we can see, we distinguish two types of aggregates: f { X :ϕ} ≺ t called GZ-aggregates (or set atoms); and f { c 1 :ϕ 1 , . . . , c m :ϕ m } ≺ t, with all c i of same arity, called F-aggregates. This syntactic distinction respects the original syntax 7 also turns out to be convenient for comparison purposes, since we can assign a different semantics to each type of aggregate without ambiguity. An important observation is that, in our general language, it is possible to nest GZ and F-aggregates in a completely arbitrary way, since ϕ and ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ m inside brackets are aggregate formulas in their turn.
Achieving this generalization is not surprising, once aggregates can be seen as propositional formulas. A GZ-formula (resp. F-formula) is one in which all its aggregates are GZ-aggregates (resp. F-aggregates). We sometimes informally talk about rules (resp. programs) instead of formulas (resp. theories) when the syntax coincides with the usual in logic programming.
The technical treatment of F-aggregates is directly extracted from [17] , so the focus in this section is put on GZaggregates, where our contribution lies. One of their distinctive features is the use of variables X . In fact, a formula ϕ inside A = f { X : ϕ} ≺ t (called the condition of A) normally contains occurrences of X , so we usually write it as cond( X). Moreover, the occurrences of variables X in A are said to be bound to A. A variable occurrence X in a formula ϕ is free if it is not bound to any GZ-aggregate in ϕ. An atom is either a regular atom (predicate or arithmetic atom) or an aggregate.
A (regular) literal is either a (regular) atom a (positive literal) or its default negation not a (negative literal). A predicate atom p( t) is said to be ground iff all its terms are constants t ⊆ C | t| ; an arithmetic atom t ≺ t is said to be ground iff t and t are numbers; and an aggregate atom f {. . . } ≺ t is said to be ground iff it contains no free variables 8 and t is a number. We write At(C, P) to stand for the set of ground atoms for predicates P and constants C. A theory is said to be ground iff all atoms occurring in it are ground. We define the grounding of a formula ϕ( X ) with free variables X as
by the constants in c and evaluating all arithmetic terms. Similarly, by Gr( ) def = {Gr(ϕ( X)) | ϕ( X) ∈ } we denote the grounding of any theory . Until Section 5, we will exclusively deal with ground theories. This is not a limitation, since a non-ground formula ϕ( X) in some theory can be understood as an abbreviation of its grounding Gr(ϕ( X)), as usual. Given a set of formulas S, we write S and S to stand for their conjunction and disjunction, respectively; we let ∅ = ⊥ and ∅ = .
To define the semantics, we assume that for all aggregate symbols f ∈ A and arities m ≥ 1, there exists a predefined associated partial function f m : 2 C m → Z that, for each set S of m-tuples of constants, either returns a number f m (S) or is undefined. This predefined value is the expected one for the usual aggregate functions sum, count, max, etc. For example, for aggregate symbol sum and arity m = 1 the function returns the aggregate addition when the set consists of (1-tuples of) integer numbers. For instance, sum 1 ({7, 2, −4}) = 5 and sum 1 (∅) = 0 but sum 1 ({7, a, 3, b}) is undefined. For integer aggregate functions of arity m > 1, we assume that the aggregate is applied on the leftmost elements in the tuples when all of them are integer, so that, for instance, sum 2 ({ 7, a , 2, b , 2, a }) = 11. We omit the arity when clear from the context.
A classical interpretation T is a set of ground atoms T ⊆ At(C, P).
Definition 4.
A classical interpretation T satisfies a formula ϕ, denoted by T |= cl ϕ, when the following recursive conditions hold:
under the usual meaning of
again, under its usual meaning
We say that T is a (classical) model of a theory iff T |= cl ϕ for all ϕ ∈ . 2
Given interpretation T , we divide any theory into the two disjoint subsets:
that is, the formulas in satisfied by T and not satisfied by T , respectively. When set is parametrized, say (z), we write + T (z) and − T (z) instead of (z) + T and (z) − T . For instance, Gr + T (ϕ) collects the formulas from Gr(ϕ) satisfied by T .
Definition 5 (Reduct). We will define the reduct of a GZ-aggregate formula A = f { X :cond( X)} ≺ n with respect to a classical interpretation T , denoted as A T , in the following way: 8 Note that ground aggregates may still contain variables, but bound to the aggregate.
The reduct of an F-aggregate B = f { c 1 :ϕ 1 , . . . , c m :ϕ m } ≺ n is the formula:
The reduct of any other formula is just as in Definition 3. The reduct of a theory is the set of reducts of its formulas. 2
Note that, when restricted to F-formulas, Definition 3 exactly matches the reduct definition for aggregate theories by Ferraris [17] . On the other hand, when restricted to GZ-formulas, it generalizes the reduct definition by Gelfond-Zhang [19] allowing arbitrary formulas in cond( X), including nested aggregates. For this reason, in our setting, the reduct is recursively applied to ( Gr + T (cond( X))) T . In the original case [19] , cond( X) was a conjunction of atoms, but it is straightforward to see that, then, ( Gr + T (cond( X))) T = Gr + T (cond( X)). To sum up, the above definitions of stable model and reduct correspond to the original ones for Ferraris [17] and Gelfond-Zhang [19] when restricted to their respective syntactic fragments. A 2 = count X : sum{Y : owns(X, Y )} ≥ 10 ≥ 2 and imagine that owns( X, Y ) means that X owns some item Y whose cost is also Y . Accordingly, A 2 checks whether there are 2 or more persons X that own items for a total cost of at least 10. Suppose we have the interpretation: T = {owns(a, 6) , owns(a, 8), owns(b, 2), owns(b, 3), owns(c, 12)} Then A 2 holds in T since both a and c have total values greater than 10: 14 for a and 12 for c. Therefore, A T 2 corresponds to ( Gr + T (sum{Y : owns( X, Y )} ≥ 10)) T . After grounding free variable X , we obtain:
Note that b does not occur, since its total sum is lower than 10 in T . If we apply again the reduct to the conjuncts above, Proposition 6 generalizes results from [17] to our extended language combining GZ and F-aggregates. In particular, item iii) provides a sufficient condition for strong equivalence that, in the case of propositional formulas, amounts to HTequivalence.
We now move to consider propositional translations of aggregates. As said in the introduction, any F-aggregate can be Our main contribution is to provide an analogous propositional encoding for GZ-aggregates. To this aim, we extend translation to be also applicable to any GZ-aggregate A = f { X :cond( X)} ≺ n with a propositional condition cond( X), so that [A] corresponds to the propositional formula: 
and [(1)] amounts to the last three rules in (3). 2 
Relation to Ferraris aggregates
In this section, we study the relation between GZ and F-aggregates. One first observation is that GZ-aggregates are first-order structures with quantified variables, while F-aggregates allow sets of propositional expressions. Encoding a GZaggregate as an F-aggregate is easy: we can just ground the variables. The other direction, however, is not always possible, since the set of conditions in the F-aggregate may not have a regular representation in terms of variable substitutions. Given a GZ-aggregate A = f { X :cond( X)} ≺ n we define its corresponding F-aggregate F[A]:
This correspondence is analogous to the process of instantiation used in [18] 
which is a conjunction of formulas like α → β for countermodels of A, whereas [A], formula (5), is a disjunction of formulas like α ∧ ¬β for models of A. Another interesting consequence of the classical equivalence of A and F[A] is that, due to Proposition 1-ii), we can safely replace one by another when negated. In other words:
Proposition 9. Let ϕ be a formula with some occurrence of a GZ-aggregate A and let ψ be the result of replacing A by its corresponding F-aggregate F[A] in ϕ. Then, we have that ¬ϕ ≡ ¬ψ . 2
However, as we saw in the introduction examples, replacing some GZ-aggregate A by its F-aggregate version F[A] may change the program semantics. Still, the stable models obtained after such replacement are not arbitrary. As we said, [20] proved that if the GZ-aggregate A occurs in a positive rule body, then the replacement by the F-aggregate F[A] preserves the stable models, but may yield more. Next, we generalize this result to aggregate theories without nested GZ-aggregates.
To this aim, we make use of the following proposition asserting that, indeed, [A] is stronger than [F[A]] in HT. (F[A] )) for any theory (A) where occurrence A is positive; ii) SM( (A)) ⊆ SM( (F[A] )) for any theory (A) In particular, this means that if we replace a (non-nested) GZ-aggregate A by its F-version F[A] in the positive head of some rule, we still get stable models of the original program, but perhaps not all of them. Theorem 2 is not directly applicable to theories with nested aggregates because applying operator [ · ] produces a new formula in which nested aggregates may occur both positively and negatively. It is well known that GZ and F-semantics do not agree even in the case of monotonic aggregates as illustrated by the example in the introduction. Nevertheless, we identify next a more restricted family of aggregates for which both semantics coincide.
Proposition 11. Any GZ-aggregate A of the following types satisfies A ≡ s F[A]:
Note that the result ii (resp. iii) of Proposition 11 does not apply if the condition X > 0 (resp. X < 0) is dropped. For instance, the program consisting of the rule p(0) ← sum{X : p(X)} = 0 (8) has a unique stable model {p(0)} under Ferraris' semantic but no stable model under GZ's one.
Relation between Alog and clingo aggregates
In this section, we restrict ourselves to the syntax of logic programming and lift the relation between GZ and F-aggregates to their respective first order languages, studying a syntactic fragment in which the semantics of Alog [19] and gringo [21] coincide. We also show that every Alog program whose aggregates are all of count type can be easily rewritten to this fragment in a human friendly way. The same applies to program that also contain sum aggregates provided that 0 does not occur as a constant in the program. It is worth mentioning that a compilation for GZ-aggregates into F-aggregates has already been described in the literature [25] . This compilation has the advantage of covering programs containing any kind of aggregates. On the other hand, it makes uses of new auxiliary atoms that obscure the semantics of the program. In this sense, this compilation is better suited for automatic translation while our rewriting, though less general, preserves human readability.
An Alog rule is an expression of the form:
where Head is a disjunction of atoms, Pos is a conjunction of regular atoms, Neg is a conjunction of negative regular literals, and Agg is a conjunction of GZ-aggregates. An Alog program is a set of Alog rules. Recall that, in this section, we no longer assume that atoms or programs are ground. Note that every Alog program is also a program in the syntax of gringo, though their semantic may differ. We also recall the notion of global variable from [21] : a variable is said to be global in a rule of the form of (9) iff it occurs in any literal in Pos or Neg or in any term t of any aggregate atom in Agg of the form f { X :cond( X)} ≺ t. An instance of a rule is obtained by replacing all global variables by constants. The gringo grounding of logic program , denoted Gr gringo ( ), is obtained by collecting all possible instances of its rules and replace every aggregate atom A by F[A]. A set of atoms T is a gringo stable model of a program iff it is a stable model of Gr gringo ( ). Note that notions of global and free variables do not coincide: an occurrence of a variable may be both global and bound. This implies that the Alog and gringo grounding of a program may be different and, as a result, the same program may have different stable models. To illustrate this fact, consider the following example from [19] :
Example 5. Let P 2 consisting of the following rules r ← count{X : p(X)} ≥ 2 ∧ q(X)
Variable X is both global in (10) and bound in count{X : p( X)} ≥ 2. As a result, the Alog grounding of P 2 is obtained by replacing rule (10) by rules
On the other hand, its clingo grounding is obtained by replacing the same rule by
Both programs have a unique stable model, but a different one: {p(a), p(b), q(a), r} for the former and {p(a), p(b), q(a)} for the latter. 2
We say that an aggregate atom is closed [26] iff no global variable occurs in it. We say that a rule (resp. program) is closed if all its aggregate atoms are closed. Then, from Proposition 11, we immediately get the following result for closed programs: From Proposition 12 and Proposition 13 it immediately follows that we can rewrite any Alog program where all aggregates are of the type count into an equivalent one in which its stable models coincide with the gringo stable models. Theorem 3. Given a logic program where all aggregate atoms are of the form count{ X : cond( X)} = t, then the Alog stable models of coincide with the gringo stable models of tr 1 ( ). 2 Example 6 (Ex. 5 continued). As mentioned above, P 2 is a program whose stable models are different according to Alog and gringo semantics. On the other hand, we have that tr 1 (P 2 ) is
whose unique stable model is {p(a), p(b), q, r} according to both semantics. Recall that this is the unique stable model of P 2 according to Alog. As a further example, let P 3 be the logic program consisting of rule (1) with n = 1. Recall from the introduction that P 3 has a unique stable model {p(a)} according to Ferraris semantics while it does not have any stable model semantics according to Gelfond and Zhang semantics. Note that, since this program is ground, gringo and Alog semantics respectively coincide with Ferraris and Gelfond and Zhang semantics as described in Section 3. Furthermore, we have that tr 1 
which has no stable model under both semantics. 2 Note that, in general, the rewriting tr 1 (·) is not safe for other kinds of aggregates with an associated function f for which there exist sets S and S with S ⊂ S such that f (S) = f (S ). For instance, the sum of the empty set and the set {1, −1} is in both cases 0 and, as a result, we have that programs involving sum over these two sets will have different stable models.
Example 7.
Let P 4 be the logic program consisting of the following rules:
It is easy to check that tr 1 (P 4 ) = P 4 , but this program has no stable model under the Alog semantics and has a unique stable model {p(1), p(−1)} under the gringo semantics. 2
Conclusions
We have provided a (strong equivalence preserving) translation from logic programs with GZ-aggregates to propositional theories in Equilibrium Logic. Once we understand aggregates as propositional formulas, it is straightforward to extend the syntax to arbitrary nesting of aggregates (both GZ and F-aggregates) plus propositional connectives, something we called aggregate theories. We have provided two alternative semantics for these theories: one based on a direct, combined extension of GZ and F-reducts, and the other on a translation to propositional formulas. The propositional formula translation has helped us to characterize the effect (with respect to the obtained stable models) of replacing a GZ-aggregate by its corresponding F-aggregate. Moreover, we have been able to prove that both aggregates have the same behavior in the scope of negation. Finally, we identified a class of aggregates in which the GZ and F-semantics coincide. It is worth to mention that a propositional formula 9 equivalent to Son and Pontelli aggregates was also given in [16] . We expect that the current propositional formula translations will open new possibilities to explore formal properties and potential implementations of both GZ and F-aggregates, possibly extending the idea of [20] to our general aggregate theories. Finally, an extension of the current approach to a full first-order language with partial, evaluable functions (as those in [27] ) was developed in [28] . This allows treating aggregates as ordinary first-order terms and combine them with arbitrary predicates, not just arithmetic relations.
Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4. First, note that ϕ ≡ cl ψ implies (ϕ) ≡ cl (ψ) due to substitution of equivalents in classical logic, regardless whether ϕ occurs positively or negatively in (ϕ). On the other hand, HT satisfies the Deduction Theorem, i.e., ϕ |= ψ iff ϕ → ψ is valid and, from the latter, we can derive the following intuitionistic consequences:
which are also consequences in the intermediate logic of HT. As a result, if ϕ |= ψ , the above formulas hold and, together with ϕ ≡ cl ψ , we can apply Proposition 3 to conclude:
Finally, we can apply these relations by bottom-up structural induction on (ϕ) having in mind that, as we can see, each time we work with a subformula in an implication antecedent, the inclusion relation is reversed. If this happens an even number of times, the final effect is canceled, and so SM( (ϕ)) ⊇ SM( (ψ)), since we started with SM(ϕ) ⊇ SM(ψ). Otherwise, visiting an odd number of implication antecedents, we get SM( (ϕ)) ⊆ SM( (ψ)). 2
Before proving Proposition 6, we introduce first some auxiliary lemmas. Lemma 1. Let H and T be two classical interpretations such that H ⊆ T and ϕ be a formula. Then, H |= cl ϕ T implies T |= cl ϕ.
Proof. The proof is done by structural induction assuming the statement holds for every subformula of ϕ. Note that H |= cl ϕ T implies that the case ϕ T = ⊥ is always disregarded. Case 1: ϕ = a ground atom. Then
